

.SIAK-Journal – Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis



Stol, Wouter et al. (2011):

Manageability of Police Patrol Work in Norway. The Problem of Implementing Community Policing

SIAK-Journal – Zeitschrift für
Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis
(3), 78-89.

doi: 10.7396/2011_3_I

Um auf diesen Artikel als Quelle zu verweisen, verwenden Sie bitte folgende Angaben:

Stol, Wouter et al. (2011). Manageability of Police Patrol Work in Norway. The Problem of Implementing Community Policing, SIAK-Journal – Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis (3), 78-89, Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.7396/2011_3_I.

© Bundesministerium für Inneres – Sicherheitsakademie / Verlag NWV, 2011

Hinweis: Die gedruckte Ausgabe des Artikels ist in der Print-Version des SIAK-Journals im Verlag NWV (<http://nwv.at>) erschienen.

Online publiziert: 3/2013

Manageability of Police Patrol Work in Norway

The Problem of Implementing Community Policing



WOUTER STOL,
*professor in Police Studies
at the Open University of
The Netherlands.*



HELENE I. GUNDHUS,
*associate professor at the Research
Department of the Norwegian
Police University College.*

In this paper we present findings from a comparative study exploring police patrol work in Europe. The study is about every day police patrol work, both emergency patrol and community beat policing. We have systematically observed what police officers do when they are out on patrol, and explored how contextual factors can explain 'why' police officers do what they do. Moreover we focus on policing in Norway. The main question discussed is in what way police management can lead the patrols towards the practicing of police strategies. After we have presented the methodological framework, we introduce some findings from Norway. These lead us to the conclusion that in Norway community beat policing is not successfully implemented. The study points to the need for professional leadership in preference to management oriented to resource allocation. The study indicates that if the police want to move from an old fashioned reactive style of policing towards community policing or problem oriented policing, they have to do more than just ask emergency patrol officers to also fulfil the role of community beat officer. However, it is not enough to appoint some officers as community beat officers. If one really wants to get off the ground this different style of policing, one should appoint community beat police officers with managerial powers.

INTRODUCTION

Our study is about everyday police patrol work. In this paper we focus on policing in Norway, in particular on emergency patrol and community beat policing. The findings lead us to the conclusion that in Norway community beat policing is not successfully implemented. On the basis of our observations we identify some factors that can help to explain these findings.

The main background for this study is that the public and those who are responsible for the management of police work should know what officers do in order to be able to give a meaningful interpretation of police management and of the democratic control of the police. The project's

aim is to provide police management and others, such as politicians and public officials, with a better insight into what influences which actions police officers perform and what possibilities police management have to affect this.

We have observed what police officers do when they are out on patrol, without measuring police effectiveness or how fast police officers do what they are doing. Police patrol work is seen as constituted by police activities. The main question explored in our study is 'what' determines what is involved in police patrol work, and how contextual factors can explain 'why' police officers do what they do, such as level of urbanization, work load, group

culture and police management. Police management is just one of the factors influencing police actions; there are several other factors such as the mentioned level of urbanisation and information facilities.

Since police actions are important elements in the constitution of police performance, one of the core issues in police management is to give direction to what police officers do or do not do when out on patrol. The main question discussed in this paper is in what way police management can lead the patrols towards practicing police strategies such as community beat policing. We will first describe the methodological framework, and thereafter we will introduce some results from Norway. In a concluding section we use these findings to discuss various models of implementing community beat policing, and police management's challenges in these reforms.

SYSTEMATIC SOCIAL OBSERVATION

The design of the research is built on earlier research on police patrol work in the Netherlands and Belgium, in total seventeen observation studies (Stol 1996; Stol et al. 2006). The aim is to elucidate the characteristics and in particular the peculiarities of local police patrol work, emergency patrol as well as community beat policing. For doing so, we need a method to draw a picture of patrol work and we need a frame of reference to distinguish between the more or less standard findings and the non-standard or unusual ones.

Before we describe the design, we will define emergency patrol as well as community beat policing. The emergency patrol's basic assignment is to supervise their patrol area and react to citizen calls. Most often they are uniformed police officers in a marked police car, usually two, but in Norway often three, being super-

vised by a command and control centre. What the officers should give attention to between citizen calls differs from place to place. 'Community beat policing' is not as standardized as emergency patrol. While doing community beat policing, the officers normally work alone; they usually do their patrol work in uniform but also regularly in plainclothes, for example when they are calling on citizens at home. As a rule, a community beat officer's basic assignment is to build up and maintain relationships with the public and/or to prevent or tackle law and order problems, preferably in close cooperation with other welfare agencies. In other words, the officers follow a problem oriented style of policing. When out on the beat, they walk or cycle, but community beat officers also patrol in a car. Different from emergency patrol officers, community beat patrol officers are not supervised by a command and control centre and as a rule they will not be assigned to citizen calls.

The method of the research is systematic social observation. Systematic, because observation is directed by structured protocols, including a list of variables that have to be recorded about each incident.¹ The method is social, since it is based on participating observations in a police team. This method is basically a qualitative method. Since we make use of structured protocols, we could speak of a qualitative method with a systematic approach.

The research team consisted of seven project leaders from five different countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Norway, and thirteen field workers. Stol supervised the field work in all participating countries, and is also able to read the languages of the countries involved. In all of the five countries we wanted to make observations in two places: one place representing police work in an urban area and the other place representing



SIV R. RUNHOVDE,
research fellow with a Master in Criminology from the University of Oslo.



KARIANNE RØNNING,
advisor in strategic analysis at Romerike police district.

police work in an area with a low population density. We also wanted to observe emergency patrol as well as the local form of community policing. The field work was carried out in twelve places.² In four out of five countries we managed to get access to the type of police teams we were searching for.³

Between September 2005 and March 2007 we observed emergency patrol as well as community policing, a total of 24 observations. Each observation consisted of us following the standard police duty schedule during twenty shifts. The field worker is attached to a group of police officers, which means that he or she will be out on patrol with different police officers. The idea is to draw a picture of policing in a certain area. The field workers produced two key documents: their completely worked-out field work notes and SPSS code forms – one for each incident. In total the field workers observed 2,089 incidents during emergency patrol (of which 199 in Oslo and 133 in Lillestrøm) and 2,094 incidents during community beat policing (of which 155 in Oslo and 82 in Lillestrøm). The field workers made also notes about, for example, what police officers told about priorities in police work, and about what the officers did between the incidents. Management were interviewed, and the field workers wrote an additional field work report with information about the city involved, the police force's organizational structure and local police policy. Every description of an incident together with the corresponding SPSS code form went through a working procedure that was designed to achieve the highest possible level of inter-observer reliability.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The basic idea with the frame of reference is to compare local numbers with average

values of all countries. For example observation of emergency patrol work in the twelve cities may discover that 57 % of all the incidents from all places have to do with maintaining the law. This 57 % can function as a reference number. However, the average values are no more than a tool helping us to discover special characteristics of local police work, average values are not norms. If some local police patrol work significantly deviates from the average values, it does not mean that this patrol work is better or worse than the average, but it is different. In this study we want to understand what causes the difference.

The frame of reference makes it possible to analyse the observations in a comparative perspective, and we can use it to discover characteristic features of the patrol work in question.⁴ Based on our systematic social observation we have constituted a picture of patrol work using several characteristics that are derived from the kind of incidents the officers deal with. The characteristics are:

1. Work load or the number of incidents per hour.
2. Sort of incidents police patrol work consists of, such as traffic, serious crime, networking.
3. The outcome of incidents: do police officers give a warning, fine someone or perhaps make an arrest?
4. Police mobilisation: do the police come into action because of a citizen call or was the incident a police initiative?
5. Marginal persons the officers have to deal with, such as addicts, mentally disturbed persons, homeless persons.
6. Police knowledge of people in the neighbourhood.
7. The use of information sources – since a core issue in police work is the producing of knowledge.

When certain characteristics deviate from the average value, we search for an

explanation in terms of the conceptual model. The conceptual model consists of seven influential factors, and is based on earlier research.⁵ As illustrated in figure 1 (see page 81), three factors on top and the one on the left refer to organizational issues. Three factors on the bottom of the model refer to aspects of the sociological environment of the organization. These seven factors can help to explain what is involved in local police patrol work, which is in the centre of the model.

‘Basic assignment’ refers to the principal task or role the police officer in question has to fulfil. Basic assignment is the answer to the question ‘how do we structure our organization’ or ‘what kind of police roles do we wish to distinguish’. ‘Basic strategy’ is the answer to questions such as ‘what are the principal elements of this police role’ or ‘what are the basic ideas of this kind of police work’. ‘Management control’ or ‘police leadership’ refers to everything police chiefs on daily routine do to stimulate or urge officers to undertake specific actions when out on patrol. ‘Information facilities’ refers to the databases the officers have access to and it refers to how easy it is for the officers to get access to the data. ‘National features’ refers to national peculiarities such as specific pieces of legislation or cultural characteristics that are typical for a certain country. ‘Local urbanisation’ refers to the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. ‘Exceptional local circumstances’ refers to phenomena that clearly dominate police work in a certain area.

RESULTS FROM NORWAY

We will now present some of the figures that follow from our observations, and show how they lead us into the world of police management. Introductorily it is important to emphasise that a table where 50 % of all incidents lie in the sphere of

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning




Figure 1: Conceptual model of police patrol work

traffic may indicate a certain proportion of all incidents, not a proportion of time. We start with presenting some tables from observations of emergency patrol and community beat patrol, and compare these with the frame of reference. The results will lead us to a discussion about the police management role in the implementation of community beat policing.

EMERGENCY PATROL

Table 1 shows how many incidents the emergency patrol officers are involved in per hour.

As you can see in Table 1, the Oslo figures do not deviate from the reference numbers, which indicate that emergency patrol work in Oslo has no specific characteristics.

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning

	Average 12 cities	Oslo	Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol			
Incidents	1.8	1.4	**1.2
Citizen calls	0.8	0.6	0.6
Police initiatives	1.0	0.8	**0.6

*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (independent T-test)

Table 1: Work load (incidents pr. hour)

That is to say, emergency patrol in Oslo might have many specific characteristics,

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning

	Average 12 cities	Oslo	Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol			
All incidents	41.6	37.7	**30.1
Citizen calls	18.9	9.5	30.6
Police initiatives	62.9	69.1	**29.5

*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)

Table 2: Proportion of traffic (%)

but this table does not make them visible. The table for Lillestrøm shows us that emergency patrol officers are involved in few incidents per hour. Specifically, the officers in Lillestrøm do not come into action on their own accord so often. Table 2, which provides us with information about traffic incidents, indicates a way to understand this.

The table shows that emergency patrol work in Lillestrøm only has a small proportion of traffic incidents. Especially when police officers come into action on their own accord, the proportion of traffic is relatively small – no more than 29.5 %, while the average percentage is 62.9. In other words, Lillestrøm emergency patrol officers do carry out significantly less car checks than the average patrol officer does. As a consequence, the officers in Lillestrøm come into action on their own initiative less often than ‘the average officer’ does. Another way to understand the small proportion of police initiatives in Lillestrøm can be the role of the management. Findings indicate that emergency patrol officers are not asked by management to take action in the sphere of proactive policing outside the area of traffic. During interviews, the chief of police claimed that officers have no time left for police actions on their own initiative.

It is not immediately clear why police officers in Lillestrøm do carry out so few car checks. This finding seems to be contrary to the fact that traffic is prioritized in Lillestrøm’s activity plan. However, Romerike police district has a special traf-

fic unit located at Lillestrøm police station. Its main priority is to carry out road side checks and take action against traffic violations. Four times a year the traffic unit organizes a large scale roadside check in cooperation with other agencies and with emergency patrol officers, but this is not included in our empirical material.

It may also be relevant that the emergency patrol officers have to cover a large patrol area. As the chief of police stressed during an interview, the officers have to drive long distances from incident to incident. The external geographical context may therefore explain why the daily working routines in Lillestrøm emergency patrol do not leave much room for incidents on the officer’s initiative. They are just too busy travelling from A to B. Instead of a ‘stop and search strategy’, which would cost them too much time, we saw them using a ‘check on the move’ strategy, with help from their colleagues from the incident room. Since traffic checks on the move do not include a police-citizen interaction, these police initiatives are not incidents in our study.

These deviations from the frame of reference point to a correlation between police numbers and the proportion of traffic in police patrol work (Stol et al. 2006). There is a connection between proportion of traffic and work load: the less occupied the officers are, the more traffic incidents (car stops and searches). Stol et al. (Stol et al. 2006) found that what officers do between citizens calls is remarkably the same in almost all places: they keep an eye on the traffic: they give attention to traffic violations and they carry out car stops and searches. The less citizen calls, the more police officers will come into action of their own accord in the sphere of traffic. Consequently: increasing the police numbers means that police management de facto give priority to car stops and searches,

unless police management is capable of ensuring that police officers do otherwise – which is rarely the case. The police management are of course able to define other priorities than traffic, and they do. But the problem is that they do not translate priorities such as ‘violence’, ‘youth’, and ‘drugs’, into concrete activities that police officers can (and should) undertake when out on patrol. Consequently, police officers stick to what is easy for them to do: pick out a licence plate and check it, stop a car and check its driver.

COMMUNITY BEAT POLICING

Table 3 shows that community beat policing in Oslo as well as in Lillestrøm has relatively few incidents per hour.

This can be explained by the fact that the officers come into action of their own initiative less often than ‘the average officer’ does. Community beat patrol (CBP) officers in both cities are quite reactive and not really proactive – compared to the average. How can this be understood?

Firstly, CBP in Oslo as well as Lillestrøm is done by ‘regular’ police officers. They are focused on emergency patrol routines and other established police tasks; they are not community beat patrol officers as described in our definition. When they are on the streets in the role of ‘community beat patrol officer’ they perform this task as if they were officers in an emergency patrol car, waiting for headquarters to assign incident-led jobs. The consequence is that police officers assigned to community beat patrol are being assigned to jobs by a command and control centre. The low number of incidents on the initiative of the police may partly be explained by the organization that the incident room has the opportunity to assign CBP officers to incidents, leaving them with less time to act on their own initiative.

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning

	Average 12 cities	Oslo	Lillestrøm
Community Beat Patrol			
Incidents	2.6	** 1.8	**1.5
Citizen calls	0.4	0.4	0.6
Police initiatives	2.2	** 1.0	**1.0

*: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.001$ (independent T-test)

Table 3: Work load (incidents pr. hour)

How is the basic assignment influencing the style of CBP in Oslo and Lillestrøm? In all countries in our study, including Norway⁶, a core issue in policy documents is that the police have to work on improving the relationship between the police and the public, focusing on communication and dialogue with the public. Community beat patrol officers are expected to establish and maintain relationships with the public. We have observed and recorded the number of incidents where the officers come in contact with citizens they have had previous contact with. The idea is that officers who have established a close rela-

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning

	Average 12 cities	Oslo	Lillestrøm
Community Beat Patrol			
Incidents	30.9	** 1.3	18.3
Traffic	7.5	0.0	6.7
Social problems	57.5	** 6.3	42.9
Other	38.3	** 1.3	22.2

*: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.001$ (Z-score for proportions)

Table 4: Proportion of incidents in which police officers meet someone they know (%)

tion to their neighbourhood more often will know the individuals they meet on patrol and during incidents. Table 4 shows the results.

Table 4 shows that the proportion of incidents in which the community beat patrol officers in Oslo meet someone they know is very small compared to the average: 1.3 %, while the average is 30.9 %. The second smallest proportion was observed in Aarschot, Belgium (13.6 %) and the third smallest in Lillestrøm, Norway (18.3 %).

Even when the officers in Oslo deal with social problems – like domestic disputes, homeless persons, mentally disturbed persons – they meet an acquaintance in a relatively small proportion of all incidents. Population density may be of relevance here. But this is not the decisive factor, since the other cities in our study with a high population density do not have a proportion that is significantly smaller than the average: Brussel: 63.4 %, Groningen: 40.8 %, Leeuwarden: 30.8 %, Bochum: 25.0 %. It is not possible to identify a specific type of incident that is responsible for this to be 1.3 % in Oslo. It seems an overall phenomenon. CBP officers in Oslo are particularly not strong in establishing and maintaining police-citizen relationships.

Although in Lillestrøm the proportion of incidents in which the officers meet someone they know is no more than 18.3 %, this proportion is not significantly smaller than the average. The organisation of the community beat patrol in Oslo as well as Lillestrøm is done by ‘regular’ police officers. Their mind is set towards reactive policing, not towards proactive community policing. Probably because Lillestrøm is a smaller community, the police officers still meet someone they know once in a while.

Community beat policing in Oslo shows weak ties with the general public, which is confirmed by the finding that the police officers in Oslo are also less acquainted with their marginal persons than their colleagues elsewhere. In Lillestrøm the police officers quite often are familiar with marginal people, and this can be explained by both the basic police role in Lillestrøm plus the relatively small proportion of marginal persons in the area. However, both in Lillestrøm and Oslo the police officers patrolling the streets are quite young, and this may affect their

knowledge about citizens, since younger police officers seldom have the specific background which the older ones have (Stol et al. 2006).

CBP in Oslo shows a small proportion of ‘networking’ and ‘internal jobs’. This confirms the downsizing of building relationships with the public, and might have to do with orientation towards law and order. The proportion of networking for CBP in Oslo is especially small compared to other large cities in the study. This may be because of a high degree of motorized patrol and presumably also because of police priorities in community beat patrol are less focussed on networking and more on reduction of crimes such as pick-pocketing and theft of cars. Problem Oriented Policing (POP) in Lillestrøm is also basically related more to law enforcement than networking. For example, they work specifically against potential criminal cases using surveillance and undercover police work. The officers get information from the intelligence service so they could work towards specific addresses or people known to the police, especially concerning drugs or gambling. These assignments required working in an unmarked car without wearing a uniform, which does not add much to networking with the general public.

Looking at the outcome of incidents (whether police officers give a warning, fine someone or perhaps make an arrest) in Oslo outside the area of traffic, the proportion in which officers on CBP fine a citizen is also relatively large (4.2 % against an average of 1.0 %; $p < 0,01$). This finding confirms that CBP in Oslo is directed towards maintaining law and order. The CBP officers’ in Oslo high degree of repressive measures might be caused by the officer’s orientation towards law and order, and confirm a working style oriented towards repressive action.

To sum up, the observations of the community beat patrols in Oslo involve a small proportion of networking and of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance. There are large proportions of traffic violation and order maintenance. This can be explained by the determinant 'basic strategy' such as the way of patrolling: which for the most part is motorized patrol and seldom foot patrol. Since the incident room assigns the cars for jobs according to a priority list, the orientation is towards law and order. Although this is not part of the police manager's policy at the station, the incident-led focus is in line with the police officers' understanding of 'real policing'. Since the patrol work observed was not 'real' community beat patrol, the finding indicates a gap between police strategy, basic assignment and the profile of the police patrol work. Primarily basic assignment, but also the way of patrolling and managerial control (assignments of jobs via the incident room) for community beat patrol, is similar to emergency patrol. Consequently, these two ways of patrolling look alike.

DISCUSSION


When community beat policing is introduced, it is possible to distinguish between two implementation philosophies. The philosophy we have observed in Oslo and Lillestrøm is what may be called the philosophy of the wide movement. In this vision all police officers should move towards community beat policing at the same time. All police officers have to move simultaneously from a reactive to a proactive style of policing. The opposing strategy is what we could call the strategy of the pioneers. Some officers start with community beat policing, stimulating others to do their share in this movement. And we can imagine several strategies that lie somewhere between these two far ends.

Based on our observations we can distinguish between five models of community policing. The models are what one may call 'ideal types'. They are analytical constructs grounded in empirical research. We have not observed one of these models in a pure form. However, if one looks at police patrol work in a certain place, it is quite easy to recognize one of these models as the dominating structuring principle behind community beat policing.

1. The first one may be called the support model. In this model, community beat officers are put at the service of other authorities, such as police chiefs and judicial bodies. We have observed this model to a certain degree in Belgium.
2. The second model is what may be called a reactive model of community policing. Officers assigned to community beat policing are put at the service of local society. A part of their work consists of dealing with calls from the public. It is not difficult to recognize community beat patrol in Oslo and Lillestrøm in this model.
3. The third model is the POP model, from problem oriented policing. Perhaps we could better call this model POP-light. Community beat patrol officers conduct an analysis of criminological and/or social problems in their neighbourhood and then proactively try to solve these problems, preferably with the help of other welfare agencies.
4. The fourth model is the full-POP model. This one is the same as POP-light but in addition to POP-light, emergency patrol officers are put at the service of the community beat officers. In other words, in this model community beat officers give direction to what emergency patrol officers undertake during the time between two calls or during the time they are not assigned to emergency patrol.


5. The last model is the same as the full POP model but with no officers assigned to emergency patrol. Emergency patrol as such does no longer exist. If there is an alarm call any officer may go to the scene to settle the incident. After the incident is settled he or she continues working on priorities in the light of problem oriented policing. We have not observed this model in practice. So far, this model only exists in the mind of some police chiefs and in some policy documents.

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning



Model 2: Different ways to organize CBP: Oslo and Lillestrøm ('wide movement')

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning



Model 3: Different ways to organize CBP: Groningen and Assen ('pioneering movement')

To conclude, we will present three examples of organizational structures that we have observed in our study. Each represents one of the above models. The first is the situation we have observed in Oslo and Lillestrøm (model 2).

At the top of the organizational chart is the police management in the form of a police chief and a deputy chief. In the centre is the group of officers who are assigned to basic police services such as emergency patrol and community beat patrol. The officers rotate between these tasks. Since dominant police culture is emergency patrol, these police officers tend to do community beat policing in an emergency patrol style. The results indicate that this way of organizing community beat patrol is not the way to successfully implement this style of policing.

The second example is the situation we have observed in, among other places, Groningen and Assen, the Netherlands (model 3).

At the top of this organizational chart is police management. Then there are two different lines top-down. The one on the right is how emergency patrol is organized, exactly the same as in the example above. The top-down line on the left shows how community beat patrol is organized. Community beat patrol officers report directly to the chief of the unit and it is these officers who are assigned to community beat patrol. To ensure that the two types of officers cooperate, they have to consult with each other. The idea is that community beat officers inform the others about actual problems that need police attention. Since community beat patrol officers fall directly under the chief of the unit, they are seen as important. The effect of this, however, is that in everyday practice no one manages community beat policing. The deputy chief is not in charge. The chief of the unit is too busy. In everyday practice we have

observed that community beat officers practice a style of policing that is different from the emergency patrol style: more towards proactive policing, more towards problem oriented policing, more towards building relationships between the police and the community. However, there is quite a distance between the two types of officers. It is very difficult for the community beat officers to push the other officers towards another style of policing.


The third and last example shows a variation on the second one. We have observed this in the city of Leeuwarden, the Netherlands (model 4).

The main difference is that this third organizational chart does not know a deputy chief. Instead of this official, the chart shows the position of a community beat officer with executive powers. This community beat officer plays two roles. Firstly, he goes out on patrol, but only now and then, since he has another and more important role to fulfil: he runs a group of police officers, and he assigns jobs to them in the sphere of community policing. In this way emergency patrol officers, if we still might call them so, are directed towards a community policing style of policing. The effect of this is that police officers in Leeuwarden, patrolling the inner city, are less oriented on traffic violations and more on other problems in the neighbourhood. For example emergency patrol in Leeuwarden consists of only a small proportion of traffic incidents. It is the smallest of all twelve cities in our study. The next smallest was the one that we have observed in Lillestrøm.

CONCLUSION

The outcomes of our study illustrate that the tables that constitute our frame of reference, such as the proportion of traffic, are indicators of important features of police patrol work. Using results from

Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning



Model 4: Different ways to organize CBP: Leeuwarden ('CBP in command')

Norway as illustrations, these findings indicate that police patrol work in Oslo, both emergency patrol and community beat patrol, is particularly directed towards maintaining law and order and not so much towards establishing and maintaining contact between the police and the public.

What we learned during the course of this study is that police management is strong on basic assignment – at designing a new organisation and moving police officers from one department to another. Do we need to do more on youth problems? Just appoint ten more juvenile police officers. Do we want to improve police-citizen relationships? Let's appoint ten more community beat officers. But police management is weak at the next step: basic strategy. What is our idea of community beat policing? What exactly does it mean to be a community beat patrol officer? Of course it is clear that community beat patrol officers should establish and maintain relationships between the police and the public. But police management have to express a clear picture of what a community beat patrol officer should be doing on a day to day basis. How does one do 'community beat

policing'. Does a community beat officer have to write tickets? Does he or she visit schools? If so, to do what? Does such an officer walk the beat in uniform? There are so many questions about how one could and should fulfil a certain police role.

The study points to the need for professional leadership in preference to management oriented to resource allocation. If the police want to move from an old fashioned reactive style of policing towards community policing or problem oriented policing, they have to do more than just ask emergency patrol officers to also fulfil the role of a community beat officer. And nor is it enough to appoint some officers as community beat officers. Although their patrol work is different, they do not have the power to change the rest of the organization. Our study indicates that if one really wants to get off the ground this different

style of policing, one should appoint community beat police officers with managerial powers.

We need police management that is capable of giving directions for what police officers should do. After all, only then it can be useful to increase police in numbers, and only then 'more police officers on the streets' will not automatically mean 'more traffic checks'. Only if the basic strategy is clear, it is useful to put 'more blues on the beat'. It is the task of police management to keep the debate going about what are good practices in terms of police activities. It is their task to set goals and to evaluate police effectiveness. Consequently, in the end it is also their task to decide what kind of activities a certain type of police officer should or should not undertake – because police activities are a key factor of police effectiveness.

¹ An incident is here defined as each encounter between a police officer and a citizen. We also speak of an incident in case of emergency calls that are passed on to the officers but that are not followed by an encounter between the officers and the public. An encounter is reported if a police officer and a citizen have verbal or non-verbal contact and the officer is performing in the role of the police.

² The twelve places are: Groningen (NL), Leeuwarden (NL), Assen (NL), Roskilde (DK), Hillerød (DK), Bochum (D), Münster (D), Brussel (B), Dendermonde (B), Aarschot (B), Oslo (N) and Lillestrom (N).

³ Denmark is the exception here, since both of the police teams were located in the countryside.

⁴ The method and the frame of reference are for free. They are both well documented in English and they are what we call today 'freeware' because we believe that if we want to develop police studies in Europe, it is important that we can use each other's research methods and that we, as a result from that, can compare our research findings and learn from each other.

⁵ In 2004, on the basis of the work of Sherman (Sherman 1980) and Bayley (Bayley 1985; Bayley 1994), and methodologically mixed observational

studies, Stol et al. made an attempt to come to a conceptual model for police patrol work, meant to give impetus to the further development of a theory (Stol et al. 2006, 170–175). After the study this model is redesigned and extended, and we revised the conceptual model of Stol et al. (Stol et al. 2006) into figure 1.

⁶ White paper 42 (2004–2005).

Sources of information

Bayley, D. H. (1985). *Patterns of Policing, a Comparative International Analysis*, New Brunswick.

Bayley, D. H. (1994). *Policing for the Future*, New York.

Sherman, L. W. (1980). *Causes of Police Behavior: the Current State of Quantitative Research*, *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 17 (1), 69–100.

Stol, W. P. (1996). *Politie-optreden en informatietechnologie: over sociale controle van politiemensen*, Lelystad.

Stol, W. P./van Wijk, A. P. et al. (2006). *Police Patrol Work in the Netherlands; an Observational Study in an International Perspective*, Frankfurt.

White paper 42 (2004–2005). *Politiets rolle og oppgaver. The Police Role and Tasks*, Oslo.